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This thesis proposes a hierarchy of documentation
for combat models. It begins by examining criticisms
and credibility of combat models to establish
underlying causes and effects, and then it addresses
model proliferation and ever increasing complexity as
they affect one 's ability to understand and transfer
models. A methodology for determining whether or not
a model is applicable to a specific problem is
presented, as are examples of potential problem
areas. Current documecitation practices are examined
for conditions that limit the transferability of
models and contribute to the credibility problem.
The aoove examinations have lead to a proposed
three-tier hierarchy of documentation, including for
the analyst documentation that is presented from the
context of discovery rather than from the traditional
context of justification. Recommendations are made
for supplemental studies to examine related issues.
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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Motivation for this thesis was initially provided by
Professor James G. Taylor, who wanted to use an existing
fully operating large-scale combat model as a teaching
vehicle in a com bat- modell ing course in the Operations
Analysis Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
.
The original plan was to acquire the ATLAS (A Tactical,
Logistical, and Air Simulation) model from the U. S. Army's
Concepts Analysis Agency, convert it for use on the NPS IBM
360 computer and develop a manual for the setup and running
of the model as part of the course. Then the attrition and
movement routines of the model were to be analyzed as a
formal thesis.
The project was especially appealing to the author
because it conformed with a fundamental belief of his, that
rather than developing new models if an existing model is
appropriate for a given analysis it should be acquired and
used. The concept is not original but was based on
recommendations of the Army Models Review Committee. [1]
Acquisition and use of ATLAS at the NPS would be an
application of the recommended concept of transferring an
existing model whenever its use is feasible.
In late Feb. 1979, the ATLAS model arrived via a
magnetic tape, and the author proceeded to execute the above
plan. After the expenditure of about four man-months of

effort by the author and computer center programmers and 190
minutes of CPU time, ATIAS was successfully compiled and
linked. This expenditure of effort was greatly in excess
of the expected time to complete the task, given that the
model has been in existence for tan or more years and is
considered to be "simple" compared with other theatre-level
models. Why had its transfer required such expenditure of
effort?
In reflecting upon the above question, the author
realized that even though a model may have been used for
many years, its transfer can still be hampered by limited
documentation. This thesis will relate the author's
experience with ATLAS and his subsequent investigation of
how documentation limits the transfer of existing models
between agencies. It will also examine the related
problems of model complexity, proliferation, credibility,
transparency, and transferability. Based on this
examination and the experiences of the author during seven
years of operation research related assignments, a new
concept of documentation to improve the transferability of
combat models is proposed.
B. DEFINITIONS
In research conducted for this thesis the author
discovered that in modeling the same word can have many
connotations. For purposes of clarity the author adopted
the definitions of modeling terras listed in the glossary of
Ref. 1. This does not imply that they are the only or best
definitions, they are only used as a point of departure.
Within the following text there will be references to
combat models, theatre-level, large-scale, and small-scale

models. For purposes of the remarks, discussions, and
recommendations contained herein, the words can be
considered synonymous. Since the initial impetus for the
thesis concerned work with a theatre-level model this term
readily crept into the author's dicussion. However, all
these forms of models are just subsets of the concept of a
combat model. What is addressed throughout the thesis is
combat modeling. Particular comments referring to one of
the subsets are just as applicable to combat models as a
whole.
Although some remarks are addressed to the DOD, others
to the Department of the Army, each is applicable to the
other as well as the other services. The discussions,
conclusions, and recommendations are equally applicable to
other complex models as well as models in general.
C. MODELING AND MODELS
What is modeling? According to Morris [2] modeling is
an intuitive process through which an analyst arrives at a
model. On the other hand, a model is an inanimate object,
an abstraction of reality [3], that is used by the analyst
to answer questions about some future state of a process.
This differentiation between modeling and a model is
necessary to understand the implications of the facts
presented and the conclusions drawn in this thesis.
To develop a model, the modeler goes through a process
of discovery. This process is the trial and error procedure
in which the designer tries to abstract the key elements of
reality. Once he has done this and validated his model, the
logical reconstruction of events leading to the model are
documented in the context of justification. This logical

reconstruction has little if anything to do with the actual
process followed in building the model. No attempt is made
to verbalize the actual psychological process, the problems
encountered, or dead ends pursued.
Over time the initial simple model proceeds through a
process of enrichment or elaboration. Through this process
the model is modified and moved in evolutionary fashion
toward a more elaborate representation of reality; in the
process the model becomes more complex as it seeks to
reflect the complexity of the reality it represents. Each
time the model is enriched the reasons why and how it is
enriched should be documented. For a discussion of the
modeling process see R ef . 2.
D. INT2ODUCTI0N
Since ancient times military planners have used wargames
to investigate various aspects of possible future military
operations. Historical development of war games can be
found in Hef. 4 or other histories of war games in the open
literature. The oldest known form of the wargame is a
Hindu chess-like game called "Chat uranga". Modern war
games had their beginning in 1664 thru the games developed
by Christopher Werkmann called military chess. In the
twentieth century the greatest proponent of war games till
the end of WWII was the German Army. Through the
development of the digital computer during the war a new
facet of wargaming became possible. The use of the computer
greatly reduced the time and effort required to conduct a
war game. Computer assisted or computer run war games
provide a means of gaining insights and experience in
military problem solutions. [5] These computer war games
help evaluate new weapons systems, study current and
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proposed military organizations and investigate the possible
outcomes of future conflicts given particular weapons,
organizations, tactics, and enemy forces. The basis of such
computer wargames is the combat model. Although there are
many military applications of combat models, this thesis is
primarily concerned with those applicable to military
strategy and force planning.
Military strategy and force planning has matured since
BWII. Prior to WWII anilitary technology evolved slowly;
those responsible for strategy and planning could easily
gain all the necessary knowledge about the relationship of
military forces and weapon systems to national security from
books or personal experience. Within one lifetime the
amount of technological change was not sufficient to render
experience invalid. The military did not plan on
technological change; it merely adjusted to it.
During and subsequent to WWII, the rate of change of
military technology began to increase in an almost
exponential manner. A lifetime of experience could became
obsolete in a few years; now mere adjustment to change was
not sufficient, the military had to plan for change. This
revolution in technology was incubated and nurtured by the
advent of the digital computer: to keep pace with
technology and its impact on strategy and force planning the
digital computer was adopted as a planning tool. With it
the means to assess and adapt technological change and
incorporate it into military strategy and force planning was
possible . [ 6 ]
Modern day force planning has become largely an
analytical process that necessarily employs the digital
computer. The digital computer has been incorporated into
many of the myriad aspects of military planning and decision
making in order to provide a scientific basis to these
11

activities. In this thesis, the computer is considered only
as a computational aid for combat models. Tha outputs of
these models are used as aids to decision makers. Strategy
and force planning depend primarily on large-scale combat
models, which due to theic complexity require the use of
digital computers. Models can be of various types or
classes; there is no agreed upon system of
classification. Discussions of classification of combat
models are contained in the literature. [3,7 8] This study
is concerned with large scale computer simulations and
analytical models as defiaed in Ref. 3.
S. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the background of this
thesis, and it has provided some basic definitions and a
general history of combat modeling to the
present. Subsequent chapters will now address the following
important aspects of aodels used for defense planning:
criticism and credibility; proliferation, complexity and
transparency, and requirements to transfer a model. Next
a common element of each chapter, lack of adequate
documentation, is identified as a contributing cause to each
of the conditions discussed. This is followed by a
proposed concept of documentation that will alleviate many
of the problems discussed in this thesis.
12

II. CRITICISES AND CREDIBILITY OF COMBAT MODELING
A. CAUSES OF CRITICISM
Critics and criticism of defense analysis and its tools,
of which modeling is just one, are ever present. Criticism
has not abated since the early sixties; it continues to the
present and threatens funding, the life blood of analysis,
in the Department of Defense. Informed private citizens and
activitists groups have ittacked the propriety of defense
analysis and DOD decisions based on analysis. The poor
public image was cited as a contributing factor to the poor
reception of analysis in Congress. Because of seeming
inconsistencies in analysis. Congress has become skeptical
and disenchanted and has questioned the utility of
analysis . [ 9 ]
According to surveys and studies conducted early in this
decade [10] activity aad expenditures on gaming and
simulation peaked in the middle 1960' s and were on a slight
decline since then. Thesa investigations indicated that
machine simulation had generally been oversold and at that
time Operations Rasearch and modeling were undergoing a
critical self-examination. [11] Tha criticisms were many
and encompassed a wide variety of cause and effect
relationships. Those of relevance to this study revolve
about the intar-related areas of transferability,
complexity, proliferation and documentation.
13

As the use of combat models increased, so did their
initial acceptance and importance, and in turn the
complexity of these models has also increased. Complexity
has manifested itself in various forms: inputs, types of
models, language, detail of actions and conditions
simulated, simulated decision making and computing
machines. Eventually the complexity of existing models,
poor transparency, and difficulty of transferability caused
numerous models to be developed that modeled the same or
very similar combat phenonema. Unfortunately, at this
juncture in the development of combat models (late 60»s,
early 70*s) criticism and dwindling credibility occurred.
This came about because for reasons not easily recognizable
or understandable to decision makers, models supposedly
modeling the same combat process under the "same" conditions
produced different and at time conflicting results.
Analysis impLies rigor and association with the
scientific method, yet standards seemed to have waned;
strict adherance to standards of scientific rigor and
discipline were less than tenacious. Often analyses and
models produced had methodological flaws. Often these flaws
were not discovered until after an analysis had been
accepted and decisions made. In studies involving models,
one of the contributing factors to this situation was lack
of detailed understanding of the model. Other contributing
factors were the pressure of time and limited
distribution. In the rush to meet deadline the quality of
the work was often sacrificed. By not distributing a study
or model to other agencies the extra set of eyes that can
see a fatal flaw through an unbiased view were never used.
The use of more than one model has often resulted in
decision makers being confronted by seemingly contradictory
results of different analyses using different models
14

addressing the same problem. No wonder that they have the
impression that the models and methods used by analysts may
not be very objective guides. Yet most analysts will argue
that a detailed comparison of models, their assumptions,
inputs and calculations, show that the results are not
really contradictory. Differences in outputs are usually
m
the direct result of differences in assumptions and methods
of processing the input data. This in turn presents the
analyst with two challenges: First, he must recognize and
understand these seeming contradictions, and then he must
resolve and convey to the decision maker these
differences. Dr. Wilbur B. Payne, former Deputy
Undersecretary of the Army for Operations Research speaking
from the point of view of the decision maker who tries to
draw valid conclusions from analyses that use such models,
has argued that he has frequently seen such apparently
contradictory results coming from various models addressing
essentially the same problem. Furthermore, the decision
making process in large organizations is such that the
detailed comparison , if it is ever done , and resolution of
seeming conflicts usually does not reach tha decision
maker. Hence, the decision maker is left with the
conclusion that simulation results are not consistant and
therefore of dubious reliability. [12]
Contradictory results of combat models is a factor cited
by Huber [12] that has caused the very credibility of combat
modeling to be questioned. Under ideal conditions a model
should be directly connected with a continuing experimental
program and should reasonably relate to other models that
simulate the same or similar processes. The user must be
especially watchful in this respect because the combat
process does not easily lend itself to establishing a
continuing experimental program. Many combat models are
neither built nor used with any forethought given to their
connection to other models. Each generally turns out to be
15

a totally independent data generator. This precludes any
meaningful experimental feedback in the on-going prediction
process and results in a mass of unrelated and often
contradictory data generated by many models.
The Army Models Review Committee report was the seminal
publication on theatre-level combat models for the
seventies. From it spraug a decade of proposals and counter
proposals concerning theatre-level combat models. However,
if one scrutenizes the literature of the previous decade a
feeling of deja vu surfaces. Many of the ideas and
arguments sounded in the seventies are in the literature of
the sixties. For an example of the problems foreseen and
warnings given, see Ref. 13.
3. IMPORTANCE OF ASSUMPTIONS
One of the key facets of any model is the assumptions
that go into its development. The importance of
assumptions w-hether in models or otherwise was recognized
early in the development of systems analysis. When Mc
Namara was Secretary of Defense, a continuing effort was
made to insure assumptions incorporated into models were
both explicit and consistent. Whether comparing force
structure or strategy, Mc Namara considered it possible to
select assumptions that will make any proposed weapon system
or organization look optimal. [6] Likewise, experience has
shown that there is no single "right" set of
assumptions. There exists an almost infinite set of
assumptions each more or less defensible. What is important
is that the assumptions used in various submodels of a model
are consistent. A model should not operate with one set of
underlying assumptions in one submodel, while another
submodel operates with a fundamentally different set.
16

Because there is no emperical data concerning modern
large scale combat, analysis is relied upon to produce
insights into the effects of existing or proposed weapons,
force structures, and strategies. Using theatre-level
combat models, the analyst can examine proposed weapons and
force structures and possible outcomes can be forcast.
Studies in the DOD [6] have shown that when alternative
force structures and weapons are examined using different
models, it is difficult to determine whether differences in
outcomes are due to differences in weapons and organizations
or assumptions and models used. Confusion can be reduced
if each alternative is examined in a consistent manner by
using the same model and assumptions. Differences that
occur can then be attributed to the basic structure of the
force options. The results can then be analyzed and
understood in light of the method of calculation (i.e. the
model) used and its inherent assumptions. Greater insights
into the effects of weapon and force structure alternatives
on combat outcomes can be gained by repeating the experiment
using an alternative model.
When more than one model is used for the same force
structure analysis often different results are obtained.
These different results ace caused by the different inherent
assumptions of each model. If these assumptions are known
informed discussion can take place because differences can
be resolved through evaluation of the assumptions. If the
assumptions are valid and acceptable, then the results must
be accepted as the logical conseguence of the assumptions.
Assumptions considered to be unacceptable by decision makers
can be eliminated by modifying the model. What quickly
becomes evident is that a model produces a result based on
its inherent assumptions; an equally defeasible but
different set of assumptions used in a model will produce
another result, which may or may not be the same.
17

The DOD is quite awars of this aspect of modeling and
has emphasized that there is more than one set of
assumptions that can be used with a given model. It
requires that all parties to the decision making process be
aware of all assumptions leading to a result. To achieve
this goal the DOD has required that all assumptions be
explicit, reasonable, and consistent. This requires
ferreting out hidden assumptions in models and insuring that
the model indeed models what it claims to model. For
interesting examples of the importance of assumptions see
Ref. 6.
C. MODEL EVALUATION
Many solutions to the problem of model evaluation have
been recommended; one concept suggests the use of full time
dedicated independent reviewers as a way of improving the
mechanics of quality control. [1] A reviewer provides a
means through which the analyst's model is scrutinized; the
assumptions and methodology are checked for internal
consistency, unwarranted inferences, and clarity of
presentation so that a determination can be made whether or
not the model is a plausible representation of the real
world. If it is a large complex model, the methodology
should be clear, even to the point of sample calculations to
guide the reviewer and analyst through the algorithms.
Equally important is that input data and assumptions be
explicit. If unnecessary proliferation is to be avoided,
existing models must be made understandable to potential
users and evaluated in some manner. It should not be
necessary to create a new model just because an existing




In his study, Gass [ 1 4 ] proposes an elaborate approach
to evaluation of complex models. Therein he highlights the
need for model implementation and maintenance procedures as
well as documentation of the model and the total modeling
process. Suggested documentation of the process includes
describing model objectives, assumptions, results, data
sources, recommendations, etc. With such documentation the
model can hopefully be evaluated and analysts can determine
whether or not the modal is valid for the problem at
hand. However, Gass found that for lost complex computer
models, organizational exigencies and real-world pressures
do not enable modelers to develop the necessary
documentation.
Gass has stressed the need to validate models at three
distinct levels, technical, operational, and
dynamic. Technical validity is an assessment of model,
data, logical, mathematical and predictive
validity. Operational validity is an assessment of errors
and divergences found under technical validity and the
robustness of the model (i.e. whether or not the model can
produce bad answers for proper ranges of parameter values)
.
Dynamic validity is the method oy which the model will be
maintained during its life cycle so that it continues to be
an acceptable representation of the real system. It
includes the process through which the model structure is
changed and validated. The ability to accomplish such
validation will facilitate and enhance the use of models by
anaylsts and decision makers other than those directly
responsible for the development of the model. Fundamental




If a model is to be of value it, mast be accepted by the
decision maker. It is incumbent upon the analyst to provide
the means of acceptance. Sufficient documentation must be
provided by the model designer to enable the analyst to
understand its methodology and structure. Key to
credibility is objective evaluation. Documentation must
provide insights into the assumptions and functioning of a
model, so that it can be evaluated. Understanding and
evaluation are complicated by complexity. Complexity and
insufficient documentation can cause analysts to design new
models rather than use an existing model. The existence of
inadequately documented models describing the same reality
is the basic cause of the criticism and lack of credibility
of combat models. The next chapter will discuss complexity
and how and why it contributes to unnecessary proliferation.
20

III. PROLIFERATIDli COMPLEXITY^. ^ND TRANSPARENCY
Unnecessay proliferation is th = cause of some of the
criticisms of combat modeling. Unnecessary proliferation
means that a new model is created because inadequate
documentation precludes the use of an existing model which
otherwise would be adequate for the task at
hand. Inadequate documentation either prevents
understanding of the methodology and structure of the model
or prevents the cost-effective transfer and conversion of
the model from one agency and computing system to
another. The latter condition is the one encountered by the
author during the conversion of ATLAS. Better documentation
would have significantly reduced the resources expended on
the project. Futhermore, in a non-academic environment the
demands of proceeding with an impending study would have
encouraged analysts to develop a new model rather than
struggle with poor or non-existing documentation.
Development of a new model can cause analysts to remodel
a combat process using techniques and methodology that
already exists; consequently funds are expended without
advancing modeling. Irrespective of any advancements in
techniques or improvements in methodology developed in
remodeling an existing process, a major portion of the
effort is devoted to redoing the basics. Time and money
spent in redoing the basics are lost as far as improving
models and modeling is ooncerned. In the DOD (especially
the Department of the Army) there has been and continues to
be a shortage of trained analysts. An obvious approach to
alleviate this problem would be to eliminate any projects to
develop models that would be redundant and share existing
21

models. However, the ability to share a model is greatly
influenced by its complexity.
When examining the practicality and feasibility of model
sharing most emphasis has been placed on
documentation. Huber [8] lists poor documentation and high
personnel turnover as a prime reasons why models are not
exchanged. The criterion used to determine whether or not a
model is transferable is documentation sufficient to allow
the recipient organization to be able to run the model
without an inordinate amount of decoding and
deciphering. Without ade:juate documentation the model is a
puzzle to the recipient. Shubick and Brewer [10] found that
few models exist in a sufficiently documented form that
would satisfy commercial firm standards prior to
distribution to their clientle.
A. PROLIFERATION AND HOW TO REDUCE IT
An area examined by the Comptroller General in 1974,
[15] was sharing of computerized models. Models developed
for specific purposes by one agency can often be used by
other agencies for simiLar purposes. Applicability of
models to new situations depends on their accuracy, purpose,
validity, availability of sufficient documentation, and
capability of the using analyst. The 1974 study surveyed
242 models that had a combined cost of over thirteen million
dollars. An attempt wis then made to obtain documentation
for about one hundred randomly selected models deemed to
have use at more than the originating agency. Information
explaining the purpose, mathematical formulation, and
operating instructions were not available for approximately
one-third of the models. The survey identified the
primary complaints of model users (programmers and analysts)
22

as: operating instructions not available or oot clear,
hence, compounding the already difficult problem of
preparing a model for use on a different computer;
mathematics of the model not clearly explained, hence,
restricting the understanding of the logic, capabilities and
limitations of the model; sample inputs and outputs
nonmatching or nonexistent or do not correspond with the
sample data in documentation, hence, verification and
validity of the model difficult to determine; flow chart
explaining logic not provided or not current, henze, complex
subroutines not easily understood. The investigation
determined that benefits can be obtained by sharing computer
models, however, before models can oe shared adequate
documentation must be prepared. Such documentation enabled
the acquiring agency to determine whether a model met its
needs and was the primary factor to successful conversion
and operation of the model on a different computer. The
potential for a cost-effective transfer is severely limited
in the absence of adequate documentation. When such
documentation is available to potential users of an existing
model great savings are realized. An exampla was the
transfer of a complex communications traffic analysis model
from an Air Force agency on the West Coast to the Systems
Development Command at Hanscom Air Field in Bedford,
Massachusetts. [15]
Joint usage of existing models not only increases the
availability of trained individuals to do further research
and analysis, but it reduces the opportunity that different
factions of the same organization are working at cross
purposes. Conflicting concepts and proposals are necessary
to vitalize an organization and make it viable, but
developing a conflicting position that could be resolved
prior to the expenditure of great sums of money and
analytical talent is a waste. The sharing of a model or
models between two conflicting agencies allows each to
23

understand the underlying basis for their respective
positions concerning an analysis Df a decision making
situation. While sharing may not resolve the conflict it
certainly will preclude the expenditure of funds in the
independent acquisition of information that is already
available through the medium of an existing model. Sharing
has eliminated retracing steps already taken and dead ends
already discovered when applied in other fields , applied to
combat modeling sharing will provide these minimal returns
and has the prospective of providing even greater
returns. If the basics are not reprocessed then more time
and money is available fDr modifications to enhance the
capability of an existing model, correct known deficiencies,
or identify suspected deficiencies. Sharing has promise to
improve the economies of modeling. [16]
Before sharing can be achieved certain basic conditiions
must prevail. Five necessary conditions [17] to model
sharing have been found. They are;
(1) a computer able to use the program with minimal
modification
;
(2) an adequate facility to run the model;
(3) adequate documentation of the original model;
(4) sufficient analysts with technical competence;
(5) formalized arrangements for sharing costs and
responsibility for costs and coordination.
24

B. THE EFFECTS OF COMPL2XITY ON TRANSPARENCY
Complexity is a diohotomous issue in itself. Gass
perceives an increasing use of more complex models [14],
while Hardison, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for
Operations Research at the 15th Annual US Army Operation
Research Symposium called for less complexity.
Disatisfaction of both senior military and civilian decision
makers with complex models and studies was emphasized by
Hardison. [18] These decision makers are convinced that
Army models and the studies they support are too complex,
elaborate the obvious, belabor needless details and overlook
key issues. Timeliness is also affected by
complexity. Failure to delimit results in failure to meet
schedules which causes something to be sacrificed; often, in
the case of models that something is adequate
documentation.
A corollary of the complexity issue is that of
transparency. If all the interactions of a model are to be
understood by both the analyst and the decision maker it
must be structured and programmed so that its methodology is
easily understood. A model that fulfills this requirement
is said to be transparent. At the 35th Session of MORS a
leading cause of the general disenchantment with
theatre- level models in recent years was attributed to a
lack of transparency in most models. The proposed
resolution to this problem was to include in the model only
those interactions and factors that can be shown to
influence the outcome. This in combination with
mathematical formulation that is as simple as possible
should produce the desired transparency. [19] Yet, at this
same MORS session A.H. Cordesman OASD (Intelligence) in
25

discussing theatre- level models remarked that models
currently being developed go into unnecessary levels of
detail in ways which seriously limit their value. This is
partially caused by intermediate managers and decision
makers requesting particular attributes be modeled. At
times modeling efforts deviate from the maxim that only
"essential" variables be modeled. As Morris [2] suggests,
the purpose of a model is to include only thosa variables
that characterize the process being modeled. At present
diametrically opposed forces exist; while expounding the
need to maintain models at a simple transparent level
current modeling efforts go into details that detract from
transparency.
A simple solution to the transparency-complexity problem
may not be easily obtained. In spite of the professional
rhetoric to the contrary, Gass [14] has found an increase in
the use of complex models at all levels of government and
industry. He attributes this to better trained analysts and
the development and refinement of methodologies. Although
simple models with readily understood assumptions,
relationships and structure are preferred, Gass contends
that decision making problem environments representative of
the Federal Government sphere cannot be realistically or
logically contained by simple models. Furthermore, senior
decision makers generally do not possess a detailed
understanding and appreciation of the methodologies employed
in the various aodels employed to assist them in the
decision making process. What is needed is a method
through which the use and interpretation of the outputs of
dels by senior decision makers is facilitated. A model is
able only if it is understood and plausible to analysts
and decision makers. They (particularly the decision maker)
must be given the opportunity to explore the use of the
model, become familiar with its predictions, and examine the





actuality the demands dq their time generally preclude
decision makers being involved at the detail levels implied
above. Therefore, it is incumbent upon analysts to evaluate
the models they use so that they are in a position to
recommend to the decision maker to use or not use the
outputs of a particular model. This implies intimate
knowledge of the essence of a model.
C. SUMMARY
To reduce unnecessary proliferation and reduce costs the
Comptroller General has recommended model sharing when
feasible. Sharing a model requires:
ability to use it with minimal conversion;
adequate facilities to run the model;
sufficient competent analysts and programmers;
adequate documentat on;
formalized arrangements for cost sharing and
coordination.
Findings indicated that the great complexity of
theatre- level models coupled with rapid turnover of
personnel has resulted in models being used as "black boxes"
with neither the computer technicians that run the model nor
the analysts knowing explicitly what or how the model
operated on the input data to provide the final results or
output. Hence, the analyst was unable to adequately explain
the results to the decision maker; with each occurence the
credibility of modeling diminished. Concurrently models
had proliferated to such a degree that the turnover of
personnel exacerbated an already critical personnel shortage
situation. Amelioration requires reduction of the number of
models in use and detailed justification before developing a
new model. [1} Reduction or the minimization of the growth
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of the model inventory implicitly requires that models be
easily and quickly moveable from one using agency to
another, i.e. posses transferability. Key to the resolution
of the problems of complexity and transparency is
documentation.
«
Complexity may be an unavoidable recourse of combat
modeling because of the demands of managers and decision
makers. Unless complex models are sufficiently documented
to make them readily understandable and usable, analysts
will create a new model. Rather than creating new models
an atmosphere conducive to the sharing of models should be
incouraged. Requirements to transfer a model are discussed
in the next chapter.
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IV. REQU IREMENTS TO TRANSFER A MODEL
The Review of Selected Army Models report [ 1 ] proposes
that the number of models retained by the Dept. of the Army
be reduced and that existing models be used where possible
before a new model is commissioned. To properly evaluate an
existing model a method for analyzing and verifying a
candidate or candidates from existing model resources must
be established. The more complex a. model is the more
difficult is this analysis and verification. [14]
Use of an existing model requires understanding of
potential problems due to model design as well those
problems expected to be encountered during transfer and
execution. Design problems can include lack of adequate
sub-models, failure to consider key variables, inaccuracies
or lack of validation, computational difficulties, and
inconsistent hidden assumptions. Problems during exection
can be those of irrelevance, inadequacy of output,
inappropriateness of assumptions, lack of connection to
other models and results, statistical and extrapolation
difficulties.
A. METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSIS OF EXISTING MODELS
3efore an existing model can be used it must be analyzed
by the potential user. Examination of the literature for a
methodology for conduct of an analysis generally produces a
concensus. Such methodologies center on five general areas.
[20 ] These are:
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(1) inputs and outputs, i.e. the global structure of the
model;
(2) the basic causil relationships assumed between
variables; i.e. the local structure of the model;
(3) the detailed logic of the model;
(4) the numerical values of the data, and
(5) the time and resources required to exercise the
model.
Additionally, an analysis should consider any
experimental studies that allow comparison of the model
predictions with the real world, other models or with the
intuitive beliefs of the decision maker that will ultimately
be presented the outputs and their interpretation. Such
previous studies are useful in evaluation of a model for
application to new problems or situations. Unfortunately,
so far as combat models ace concerned, comparisons with real
world results are extremely limited. When such data is
available (e.g. WWII and Korea) it is sparse, subject to
conflicting interpretation, and of questionable accuracy.
[21]
A detailed examination of the global structure of a
model can forthrightly answer the basic question of such an
analysis. Is this model capable of examining the problem
at hand? The potential user is interested with whether the
outputs measure the desired quantities and or qualities, and
whether the desired inputs can be entered into the model in
the form in which they are available. Using an existing
model is not cost-effective if available input data must
undergo a costly and time consuming conversion. There must
be provisions in the model structure to allow changes in the
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input data to reflect chinges in the combat process under
examination.
The local structure is examined to expose important
causal influences which may have been omitted for ease of
computational effort or other reasons. This step is closely
related to the abstraction process in the design of tne
model. It is most dependent on the detail and completeness
of available documentation. It is critical because the
importance of a causal connection can be quite subtle but
very pervasive.
Examination of the detailed logic of a model identifies
the hypothesis upon which the model is based. It reveals
extent to which it is based on historical and experimental
field data. It is another indicator of the appropriateness
of the model to solve the problem at hand. This step also
reveals the presence of inconsistent assumptions or
inappropriate assumptions.
Finally, analysis of the time and resources required by
the model provides the means through which the costs
associated with the use of the model can be determined. To
make rapid and accurate astimates the description of the
model must provide explicit information of time requirements
to gather and prepare required inputs as well as the time to
execute the model given the inputs.
If models are to be truly transferable between agencies
the above analysis must be comleted prior to any attempt to
transfer a model. Accurate and complete document* tion must
be available if this is to be conducted. Such
documentation will be available only if it is prepared
concurrently with the development of a new model and in




B. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN EXISTING MODELS
To adequately analyze an existing model tha analyst must
be familiar with potential problem areas. Parrell [20] has
suggested that the analyst consider:
(1) the adequacy of submodels, i.e. do they model what
they purport to model;
(2) whether key variables were overlooked during the
process of abstraction;
(3) the possibility Df inherent inaccuracies;
(4) possible computational i ifficulties;
(5) whether the modal has inconsistent and inappr oriate
assumptions;
(6) possible inadequacy of output.
Among the problems of design can be found cases where
the general model structure is adequate but reasonable
submodels are not available. This is particularly true of
sub-models involving simulated tactical or strategic
decision making. Farrell [20] has indicated that most
diagrams and flow charts of such sab-models do not reveal
the sub-model inadequacy.
In designing a model the first and most difficult step
is insightful abstraction by the modeler or moielers. To
abstract the real worli into a representative model, key
variables, their basic causal relations and interpretation
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must be incorporated into the model. This step is very
difficult to verbalize since any description of the process
to be modeled will necessarily incorporate the results of
abstraction in the elements of the description. This step
is imaginative, creative, and complex; it is imperative that
it be documented at the time of abstraction. Once a
process has been modeled and time passes the explicit steps
and reasoning thru which the abstraction was made cannot be
adequately described by the modelers. Failure to consider
key variables occurs at this almost invisible step of
abstracting a process of the real-world into a model or
sub-model.
In the review of an existing model it is these almost
invisible steps of abstraction that must be thoroughly
examined to insure all key variables are included in the
model. Key variables can also be excluded because of lack
of adequate sub-models or computational problems their
inclusion or manipulation would precipetate. The reviewer
or user of an existing model must carefully search for key
variables that have not been modeled or are simply thruput
in the model.
Another pitfall hidden in the design of existing models
is inaccuracy or lack of validation. Often because of
computational difficulties known experimental results have
not been included in a particular model. This occurs most
often as a result of exigencies on the modeler or modelers
at the time the model is created. Exclusion of such
experimental data results in inaccuracies. Lack of
experimental support for portions of military models is
another common cause of inacuracies which cannot always be
avoided. Likewise, inadequate debugging of the model can
be a reality. This is not serious as long as these
inaccuracies are known. Unfortunately, these facts can
escape a potential user if a careful review of the model
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design and its use is not made.
A thorough review of model documentation can reveal
computational difficulties if the documentation is
adequate. These difficulties usually involve either
algorithmic imprecision or excessive date storage
requirements. These limitations should oe revealed by the
documentation to the potential user so that proper use of
the model can be made, unexpected or excessive costs are not
incurred or another model can be selected.
The bane of analyst using an existing model is
inconsistant hidden assuaptions . Such assumptions included
as part of the overall model can be at odds with those of
sub-models, the data base, and data generating routines.
The most pervasive error awaiting the unwary user of an
existing model is the inappropriateness of inherent
assumptions. This potential error is the most difficult
to detect when using a pre-designed combat model, since the
user is generally not well versed in the process through
which the abstraction of the real world was made. During
the abstraction fundamental assumptions concerning the
nature of the combat process as well as assumptions for
computational reasons were made. Only through careful study
of the line of reasoning followed at the creation can a
would-be user become familiar, with these assumptions. Care
must be taken so that not only the explicit but also the
implicit assumptions are understood and their effect on the
combat process being modeled is
comprehended. Unfortunately, the reasoning and logic




If there are potential problems awaiting the unwary
analyst in the design of an existing model, these are just
the forebodings of greater problems associated with the
actual exercise of the model. Foremost of these is
irrelevance, that is caused by either attempting to use a
model on a problem for which it was not designed or a
failure to understand the problem thoroughly enough to
select an appropriate model.
Concomitant with irrelevance is inadequacy of
output. This results when useful information is inherent in
the model itself but actual calculation and or display does
not exist. Causes of such conditions are selection of an
improper model or lack of full understanding of the
intricacies of the model. Proper and adequate
documentation and careful perusal will ameliorate the
situation.
In complex simulations, both situations and key
parameters will be variei and the results examined. The
number of unique situations examinsd is limited by resource
and time constraints, because of this the potential user
must be sure that required outputs are readily available.
Adequate descriptions of the output of any random
process are difficult to achieve under the best
conditions. Under time constraints descriptions of the type
of output provided by a model as well as how the outputs are
collected is critical. Without it, the user cannot
correctly interpret the results obtained. When available
time and resources preclude simulating all situations the
problem of extrapolating or interpolating between the
particular situations modeled arises. There is no adequate
general method for surmounting this problem; the problem is
less severe the less complex is the model being used. Any
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statistical difficulties encountered only compound the
problem. Surmounting this problem is a function of the
ingenuity of the analyst and the detail of the documentation
available to him. In the case of theatre- level combat
models obviously, neither all situations can be simulated
nor are there adequate historical or experimental data with
which to compare the results obtained. k thorough
accurate and consistent iaterpretation of the outputs of
such a model is highly dependent on the analysts intimate
familiarity with the mathematical structure within the model
as well as interactions between the various input and output
data. Such intimacy is obtainable only through available
documentation if the analyst uses an existing model designed
by someone else.
C. SUMMARY
Transfer of existing models between agencies is one way
of reducing proliferation. Prior to such a transfer a
potentionally usable model must be analyzed for





model logic and structure;
available data and required data;
time and resources required.
Many potential problems are contained in an existing










The ability and to what degree model analysis and
consideration of potential problems can be accomplished is
determined to a great degree by available




V. STATUS AND ADEQUACY OF CURRENT DOCUMENTATION
A. DEFINITIONS AND 3ACKGR0UND
Program documentation is a collection of information to
explain the design, development, and maintenance of the
program as well as purposes, methods, logic, relationships,
capabilities and limitations. [5] Except for ths simplest
programs it is difficult, if not impossible, for someone
other than the originator to determine what is supposed to
be accomplished by just reading the program code.
Documentation is necessary for: planning, programming,
managing, operating and evaluating models. It is absolutely
essential for: guick and effective changes; use of the
model by programmers and analysts other than the
originators; understanding of what is being done;
interagency program sharing; verification of proper model
operation. Through adeguate documentation secondary users
gain an understanding of a model and thus the model and its
outputs are rewarded a ley el of credibility. It is vital
if secondary users are to be able to run the model and make
necessary modifications of the program. This restrains
proliferation and duplication which can result in major
savings; besides it tempers an already complex
environment. tJnf ortunately, current documentation practices
are such that the documentation to facilitate the use of
existing models generally does not exist.
38

B. CURRENT DOCUMENT ATIOS PRACTICES
Although document ation is an aspect of computer
programming that was recognized from the inception of
automatic data processing as being critical to successful
programming, it has been and still is a major problem
area. Unfortunately, for various reasons including time and
fiscal constraints as well as lack of definitive guidance
concerning requirements and standards, the bulk of the work
effort concerning documentation has consisted of unfulfilled
requirements. Notwithstanding the fact that programming
has existed since the inception of ENIAC in 1944, the lack
of adequate documentation received major attention in
studies concerning models and simulations as well as
investigations by the Comptroller General of the Army in tne
late sixties and early seventies. [10,15]
Irrespective of the aforementioned studies the problem
of inadequate documentation persisted and was the subject of
another investigation oy the Comptroller General in
1974. [15] Over seventy federal installations in the
continental United States, Europe, and Asia were
surveyed. These included selected DOD Agencies as well as
those of each of the armed forces.
The study cited several problem areas attributable to
inadequate documentation. Increased cost of operations was
high on the list. Beciuse of inadequate documentation use
of operating programs is hindered since current operators do
not fully understand how and what is being done in a
program. Therefore, when unexpected outputs are obtained
it is difficult if not impossible to determine their
validity. Equally perplexing is inadequate documentation of
subsequent modifications incorporated into the model. In
many cases without adequate documentation it was impossible
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for a new analyst an! or programmer to use or modify an
existing program. Ultimately such models have to be
completely rewritten or the time required to make them
usable was greatly in excess of the time required when
adequate documentation was available. In a cited example
inadequate documentation caused an agency to spend over a
year to determine how a particular complex model
operated. Another example indicated the difference of six
man-months of work incurred because of the lack of
sufficient documentation. Although the Comptroller General
found it difficult to determine the aggregate cost of
increased operating expenses due to inadequate
documentation, he did indicate it was high because of the
number of cases uncovered.
Lack of sufficient documentation was the major cause of
the problems encountered by the author during the conversion
of the ATLAS model. Shen machine differences required
changing the program code there was minimal guidance as to
which sections of the code corresponded to particular
functions described in the user's manual. " 22 ] Also,
details of the mathematical structure of ATLAS are not
contained in the manual. For details of the model
structure references are made to a models manual [23] for
the predecessor of ATLAS. The extent to which the structure
of this model has been incorporated into ATLAS is not
explicitly stated. The situation is further complicated by
the fact that pertinent assumptions basic to the model
formulae are not in the models manual; they are in the
user's manual listed in a haphazard manner. Since the
models discussed were originally designed for the
predecessor of ATLAS there is no assurance that changes to
the model formulae were Dot made during the evolution of
ATLAS. This suspicion is enhanced by the fact that in 1973,
five years after the design of ATLAS, a significant
programming error was found. [24]
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There are a myriad of reasons why model documentation is
inadequate. One of the primary causes is that documentation
guidelines and policies are developed by individual Federal
departments and agencies. At the highest levels the
guidance is necessarily general, as it moves down the
organization further more explicit implementing directives
are provided culminating in directives issued by the
developing agency. Hence, some documentation is brief and
simplistic; other documentation is detailed, voluminous and
complex; neither may prove to be adequate. Adequacy is
determined by the ability of other than the originators to
use and understand the model. The Comptroller General found
that even when guidelines and standards were prescribed
managers of modeling projects failed to insure
compliance. The type and content of documentation is often
decided by computer technicians or ADP operators. [15]
Shubik [17] has cited this practice as unprofessional since
ambitious programmers have been known to change coding in
the pursuit of computing efficiency without making note of
the fact.
An examination of 264 model documentation packages at 10
California installations revealed none fully complied with
the agency standards and most were incomplete, inconsistant,
and inadequate. [15] In most cases programmers determined
what documentation to prepare based on their own
judgement. Managers responsive for developing models
indicated that the reason standards were not adhered to was
because of time contraints. Completion dates frequently
were given precedence over preparation of adequate
documentation. The desire to complete a model and get it




An aspect of managerial responsibilities concerning
documentation is that it be kept current. Even if a model
is initially adequately documented it will eventually be
modified and its documentation must be likewise
updated. This is a major problem because it requires
diligence to update documentation. Siven time and resource
constraints and the exigencies of the decision making
process it is a task that can easily be put off since the
model will work without such documentation. The problem
comes later when the personnel that modified the program
become involved with other demanding problems, leave or are
transferred. Later the documentation is difficult to
prepare because the reasons why or how the modification was
made become unclear or those that knew what was done are no
longer available.
There are numerous comment cards in the ATLAS program
that indicate changes were made. However, there is no
formal documentation, with one exception, to indicate what
or how these changes were made. Informal documentation
provided was minimal and superficial and did not address all
the indicated changes. The one exception was a formal
document [25] prepared in 1974, which discussed improvements
in the treatment of barriers and personnel replacements. A
global variable and subroutine listing were provided but
these were not up to date; had they been current the
conversion would have been facilitated.
Poor or nonexisting documentation persists irrespective
of the efforts of the Comptroller General and the Department
of Defense. Inspite of the identification of this problem
early in this decade [1,10,15] its presence continues to be
a problem at the close of the decade. [3] The continuing
lack of detailed documentation that enables an analyst to
understand what goes on inside a model is cited by Shupack
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[26] in 1979, as a limiting factor in the use of
theatre- level combat models. Although there was a
noticeable improvement, he found the level of documentation
of IDAGAM not sufficient to insure the easy and proper use
of the model without supplementing the available
documentation. Without adequate documentation the analyst
is apt to make erroneous conclusions regarding the processes
occurring within a model.
Although documentation problems persist genuiQe attempts
to resolve the problems have been made. Current combat
modeling efforts at the Naval Postgraduate School are not
only using languages especially designed for simulation but
the documentation methods employed enhance the transparency
of the model. For examples see Ref. 27, 28, 29. Other
agencies have also made inroads toward improving the
adequacy of documentation. See Ref. 30, 31,
32. Irrespective of these improvements the author believes
a vital aspect of documentation is being overlooked. This
aspect and appropriate recommendations are set forth in the
next chapter.
SUMMARY
Studies as well as intuition reveal that to understand
the workings of a complex model an analysts requires a
detailed explanation of the calculations and data
manipulation performed by a simulation. Implicit and
explicit assumptions and inputs must be known if an analyst
is not going to use a model as a black box. A detailed
knowledge of the variables, subprograms and their
relationships must be acquired if a model is to be
transferred from one using agency to another. Rarely will
both organizations posses the same brand of data processing
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equipment, more likely than not there will be great
dissimilarities. Conversions from one machine to another
requires that changes be made to the model. To change the
model the programmer and or analyst must know the effect his
change will have not on only the particular line of code he
is changing but throughout the program. Analysts must not
only know how a change will affect ths physical
minipulations and computations of the various parts of the
model but how it will interact with the implict and explicit
assumptions of the model. To gain this level of
comprehension of a model designed by someone else the
analyst and programmer of the gaining organization must
consult the documentation provided with the model.
Without such documentation analysts have chosen to construct
a new model. Unfortunately, the general concensus of the
investigations was that documentation was of dubious quality
and generally inadequate. [1,10,15]
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71. PROPOSED HIERARCHY OP DOCUMENTATION
The discussion of who the user is, the role of the
officer analyst, and the documentation concept that follows
is based on seven years experience in operations research
related assignments, discussions with analysts, programmers
and students, and problems encountered during conversion of
the ATLAS model. The author has drawn upon the above
sources and selected litsrature [4, 15, 17, 33, 34, 35] to
propose a new concept in model documentation. This new
concept is intended to refine and supplement current
documentation methods. Implementation of the proposed
concept will hopefully fill a void that currently exists and
will greatly improve the transparency and transferability of
combat model.
A. THE USEE AND THE ANALYST
Before proceeding further it is necessary to define the
often referred "user". It is one of the more vague terms
associated with combat modeling.
Now, who is the user? The user is the study director
and/or decision maker. These individuals need documentation
that provides an overview of the model, with indications of
its capabilities and limitations and general applicability
to the problem under study. The details of the conceptual
basis of the model and how and what information can be
provided along with an evaluation of its suitability should
be provided by the analyst.
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The analyst is the manipulator of the model. He is
responsible for using the model to support the study
objectives. This means he is responsible for the collection
and insertion of input data and interpretation of the output
data. If the model is small, he may do the coding; or if it
is complex, a programmer may assist him in the coding
process. Any interpretation of how the model represents
reality is the analyst's responsibility. To fulfill this
responsibility he must be familiar with the conceptual basis
of the model, its underlying assumptions, how the model was
transformed into the program code, and how the cole operates
to present the process modeled. The analyst must know if
any changes to the conceptual foundation of the model
occurred in the process of programming (coding)
.
There is a reluctance on the part of many military
analysts to gain an intimate understanding of a complex
combat modal. Exingencies of the organization are some of
the prime reasons. In the daily demands to manipulate a
model and to produce results there is insufficient
allocation of time to study the inner workings of the
model. Reliance is placed almost exclusively on the user's
manual to explain the results produced.
Some analysts (this is particularly true of the officer
analyst) refuse to gain detailed understanding of the inner
workings of a model because they do not perceive that to be
their function. Their perception is that they are the user
and do not require that level of detailed knowledge. Others
hesitate to learn or become well versed in the functions of
a particular model because they fear such expertise will
label them and hence limit the scope of their future
assignments. In discussions with officer analyst students
and practicing officer analysts, the author found these
attitudes to be quite pervasive. Many considered detailed
knowledge of how a model operated to be in the realm of the
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programmer's responsibility. Little or no consideration was
given to the fact that most programmers have little or no
military background and cannot possibly relate the
machinations of the program code to the combat process. The
programmer views proper operation in terms of proper
execution of programmed instructions. Whether or not
instructions properly depict the realities of the combat
process are beyond their scope of interest. They have
neither knowledge, inclination or experience to evaluate the
fidelity of the code.
Attitudinal attributes of military analysts can be
understood in light of their rapid turnover in
assignments. Rapidity of reassignment discourages the
desire • to gain detailed knowledge of any particular
model. Most likely they will be reassigned shortly, to
other type duties. If subsequent assignments deal with
combat models, most likely, it will be a different
model. Any time expended in the study of details of the
model associated with the current assignment is considered
of minimal value. When an effort is made to understand a
model it is often frustrated by inadequate documentation.
Probably the most frequent attitude seen in officer
analysts is the one associated with the military psyche,
that of being a generalist. This attitude is the result
of the total experience of the profession; it has been the
way to reach success in the past, and many believe that it
still is the way to success. Although there has been
considerable effort to change this mind set, the example of
the last few centuries is difficult to overcome. Compared
to the existence of the military profession, the experience
of the military analyst is of recent vintage. Only
favorable experience will provide the impetus for change.
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The transfer of models between agencies will contribute
favorably toward convincing analysts to gain detailed
knowledge of combat models. If they know that the effort
expended now can be used at a later time in some future
assignment, the effort will be considered worthwhile. But
adequate documentation is a prerequisite of such
transferability. Hence, there is an intecdependency
betweeen documentation and convincing military analysts to
gain a detailed understanding of combat models. If they can
see value in the expenditure of tie time and effort, they
will be willing to make the commitment.
Shubik [16] has found that the mathematical modeler and
the person who understands the reality the model attempts to
abstract are not necessarily the same person. The combat
process is best understood by senior military decision
makers who are generally unable to translate it into the
appropriate abstraction and who generally desire greater
detail than is necessary. A good model is one that is able
to abstract and describe Dnly that which is relevant to the
problem under investigation. On the other hand the
mathematical modeler is frequently an individual who
generally lacks the experience and an appreciation of the
nuances of combat which can lead to the development of an
ill-structured model. The military officer analyst
represents a step toward providing a modeler or model
operator who not only understands the mathematical aspects
but the military factors as well. If this capability is to
be maximized when dealing with existing models, there must
be documentation which allows the analyst to link the
conceptual model formulation to the executable
program. Then he can understand the conceptual basis of the
model, insure the program fulfills the concept, and act as a
source of information for the decision maker.
48

B. ORIGIN OF THE DOCU HEN! ATION SHORTFALL
The initial theatre- level combat models used in the
United States were designed and operated by contract
organizations (e.g. Research Analysis Corp.). These models
had a manual referred to as a user's manual which provided
an overview of the model, input requirements, and a
description of the output. For an example see Ref. 22.
Documentation within the manual was superficial, at most it
provided the proverbial big picture. Sufficient
information was provided to determine the general
capabilities of the model, possible suitability for a
particular study and a general indication of expected
outputs. It provided little if any information on the
insights that could be attained or subtleties of the
model. The user for whom this "user's manual" was designed
was a project manager or some level of decision maker. The
details could be filled in by the persons who would operate
the model, this most likely was the designer of the
model. Because of budgetary reasons and doubts that these
model operaters understood the nuances of military
operations, the decision was made to bring these models
directly under Dept. of the Army control.
When these models passed "to Army control all
documentation passed with them. Unfortunately, in most
cases the documentation was minimal consisting primarily of
program listings, operator instructions, global variable and
subroutine listings, flowcharts, user's manual and possibly
some limited discussion of the formulation of the model.
These models were placed under control of the agency that
would use them in support of force planning and strategy
studies. The designated users that inherited these models
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were the military analysts (officers and federal employees)
assigned to the organization that rscaived the models. The
analysts then took the model and the user's manual and
proceeded to exercise the model in support of on-going
projects.
Use of the user's maaual by the analyst was mandated by
the fact that input requirements and preparation were
contained in it. However, when the models were initially
transferred from the designing corporation to the Army no
supplemental documentation was prepared or
provided. Analysts were using a manual that provided only a
superficial examination of the model. They performed
analyses using a manual originally designed for a study
director or decision makar. These "user's manuals" did not
contain the detailed information of the model that is
necessary if the analyst is to know and understand the
machinations through which the input data is exposed to
produce a given set of outputs.
Evenually conflicting results were obtained from models
supposedly examining the same situation. When called upon
to resolve or explain thase discrepancies the analysts were
unable to do so. To explain the conflicts a detailed
understanding of the coaceptual basis of the model as well
as detailed information of the translation of tha conceptual
model into program code was needed. Only with this
information could the analyst explain why two models
examining the same combat process under the same conditions
produced different results.
Analysts then discovered that the documentation provided
with the model did not provide this insightful
information. To answer the question the model dasigner had
to be contacted. At times this was impossible because the
actual model the designer no longer was with the firm that
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developed the model, nor was there available any
supplemental information on the inner workings of the model.
Instances in which the designer could be located usually
proved just as unrewarding. In most cases the designer had
no supplemental formal documentation. When he acted as the
operator of the model on behalf of the Army he could answer:
such questions based on his design knowledge and daily
contract with the modal. Since there had been no formal
requirement for such supplemental information, it never was
prepared. Once the model passed under operational control
of the Army, the designer was precluded from daily
contact. Over time the designer's intimate familiarity with
the model waned, especially the intracacies of the
translation from basic concept to operating program
code. If the designer had not done the actually coding,
similar results were usually experienced when trying to
locate the original programmer or obtain supplemental
information. What the program code was actually doing was
not readily apparent and documentation or personal knowledge
of its operation were unavailable. The situation is best
expressed by a quote from Robert Frost. When once asked by
a critic what he meant by a particular phrase in one of his
works, he replied, "When I wrote it Sod and I knew what it
meant, now only God knows". This same situation will also
prevail with combat models unless adequate documentation is
created concurrent with the design and development of the
model.
COMMUNICATION AND LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION
The prime purpose of documentation is communication:
communication of why and how realities are abstracted and
condensed into a form suitable for exercise on a computer to
predict a future state of some combat process. Generally
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the level of professional communication between decision
makers, analysts, and modelers has been low as attested by
the credibility problem previously discussed. This coupled
with the turnover of military decision makers and analysts
has not enhanced conpr ehension of and control over
large-scale combat models. Very often the information about
context and limitations of these models has not been fully
understood by the military analyst and therefore not clearly
presented to tha decision maker. Documentation that can
provide such enlightenment to the analyst will be a
significant, step toward providing the required insights into
combat models needed by decision makers. Through adequate
documentation ths user and analyst gain understanding, and
with understanding can come acceptance and the decision to
use the particular model.
In combat modeling there ara three levels of
participation with necessary intercommunication. At the
highest level is the decision maker who uses the model as an
aid to gain insights and in conjunction with judgement
arrive at a decision concerning force structure or
strategy. The intermediate level is occupiad by the
analyst, who either designs a model or uses an existing
model; prepares inputs; exercises the model and interprets
the outputs. If the model is new to the decision maker he
also aids in the model selection process by recommending and
explaining the inherent attributes of particular models in
pursuit of a projected study. At the lowest level is the
programmer, who writes the necessary code during model
construction, explains the limitations of execution of a
model on a particular computer, insures the model is
processed as the program intended it and to code necessary
modifications to a nodel. Each level has unique
requirements and responsibilities and therefore the
documentation required by each is unique.
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The decision maker uses his documentation to gain an
overall appreciation of a nodel and sufficient understanding
to question the analyst on model details necessary to make a
decision to employ the model and use its outputs. It
provides a means of conducting discussions that can reveal
what insights can be gained from a particular model. The
decision maker uses his documentation as a link between the
analyst and himself.
The analyst occupies the pivotal position between the
decision maker and the programmer. His documentation is
necessarily the most broad in scope as well as variation of
detail. It must provide intimate knowledge of the model to
allow selection, sufficient detail to answer questions from
the decision maker and ask questions of the programmer. It
must provide the key to the inner workings of the model.
Programmer documentation allows the programmer to
maintain and modify the model and answer the questions of
the analyst. It allows the programmer to maintain
efficiency of operation and insure execution in accordance
with the dictates of the design. It must clearly indicate
how the computer interacts the inputs and programming code
to produce the outputs.
D. A CONCEPTUAL THEORY OF MODEL DOCUMENTATION
Current texts that describe the documentation process
usually are texts on the subject of computer systems. The
guidance provided, though attempting to be general, is
oriented toward documentation of programs that are bulk
processors of systematic information, i.e. financial
records, administrative records etc. Most emphasis is
placed on how to use the available program to process the
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data available, minimal emphasis is directed toward how the
processing is accomplished, because the processing is not
complex but routine and easily understood. For an example
see Ref . 33.
In the field of combat modeling little guidance is
available in the form of textbooks describing documentation
methodologies. In order to maximize detailed unlerstanding
as well as transferability of combat models a new concept of
documentation is proposed and set forth in this section.
To fulfill the requirements discussed above the
documentation must provide the complete understanding of how
the model was created, underlying assumptions, explicit
description of the formulations and numerical methods
employed and detailed description of the mechanics of the
program code and its execution. Most current documentation
described as a user's manual (e.g. see Ref. 22), executive
summary or by some similar title is sufficient to fulfill
the proposed non-technical documentation that follows.
Programmer's documentation is widely described in the
literature of computer systems and needs just a few
additions in respect to combat models. Assuming that the
documentation is provided as described in the Literature,
minimal modification is required. Primarily this is a
charting and cataloging procedure to allow ease of tracing
variables through the program and understanding the linking
of subprograms to the main program. Current documentation
requirements stress flowcharting. Flowcharting is
comparable to electronic schematics and allows one to see
the logical flow of the process being programmed. In the
coding step this logical flow is translated into a
mechanical flow of variables through mathematical and
logical formulations and subprograms. A charting procedure
will be like a blueprint that shows the physical connection
of the main and subprograms. The catalog will explicitly
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state how variables are interacted and passad between
subprograms.
For the analyst's documentation a new concept is
proposed. Rather than describing the modal in the
traditional manner, i.e. from the context of justification,
the analyst's documentation should be presented from the
context of discovery. [2] Using the traditional concept the
model is documented by stating the assumptions of premises
which determine the outputs of the model, showing the final
mathematical formulae that represent the abstractions of the
relavent characteristics of the modeled process, discussing
the inputs required to support the given formulae, and
listing the outputs that :an be obtained from the model and
inputs.
This is not the manner in which the model was formulated
and such documentation in the context of justification does
not enlighten the analyst in terms of how the designer
arrived at this particular abstraction of the combat
process. One must conclude that this type of documentation
is not of great help to the inexperienced analyst if he is
attempting to understand the essence of a combat model. If
the analyst is to gain a intimate knowledge of the
functioning of a model, ha must be able to ascertain how the
model came to be. This provides him two invaluable
insights. First, he gains an insight into the abstraction
process of the designer. It is a glimpse of tha reasoning
procsess by which the designer cut through the myriad of
details to deduce the fundamental variables that allow a
model to approximate the complexity of a given combat
process without having to model each of the multitudinous
factors that compose the actual process. Second, he gains
knowledge of the factors that were considered as
representative of the coabat process but were discarded
because they seemed not to be necessary predictors. This
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step in itself is worth the cost of providing this type of
documentation. What it provides is a historic record of
factors and related assumptions considered and reasons why
they were ultimately rejected or accepted. The information
provided must be succinct and allow understanding of the
abstraction process without introducing voluminous detail
and unnecessary costs. This will be an aid not only for
the follow-on analyst bat all those that come later. It
will preclude subsequent analysts from expending time and
money to determine why particular factors are or are not
modeled. Hence, if they wish to modify or elaborate upon a
combat model and information about previously considered and
rejected alternatives is available, the expenditure of
resources to reinvestigate a particular alternative and gain
only duplicate information will be precluded.
E. REQUIRED LEVELS OF DOCUMENTATION
All the evidence gathered indicates three levels of
documentation for models are required. These levels of
documentation are:
(1) decision- maker level, (facilitates communication
between the decision maker and analyst)
;
(2) analyst level (fosters communication between analyst
and decision maker and enhances working relationship with
the programmer)
;
(3) programmer level (provides detailed understanding of












Figure 1 - PROPOSED HIERARCHY OF DOCUMENTATION
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First, the decision maker who uses the model as an aid
to his judgement requires a non- technical description of the
model. Non-technical not because the decision maker cannot
comprehend the technical details but because the exigencies
of the organization preclude him from devoting the necessary
time and effort. Second, the analyst that exercises the
model, prepares the analysis, and assists the decision maker
requires a technical description of the model. This enables
the analyst to know how the model functions and explain and
interpret the outputs of the model. Third, the programmer
needs detailed documentation that explains the mechanics of
the program. This documentation provides the means to
troubleshoot problems encountered during routine running of
the model and implement future modifications. The levels
of activity and their required documentation are shown at
Fig 2.
F. DECISION MAKER'S NON-TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
A non-technical reference manual for use by decision
makers should provide sufficient information to determine
general applicability of the model. It should include a
general description of how the model operates and the major
components, the specific purpose for which the model was
originally designed and the known limitations should be
stated. This will allow the decision maker to assertain the
overall ability of this particular model to assist him in
the problem at hand. The manual should describe the data
requirements, available outputs, and any options provided by
the model. This facilitates the initial planning process
because it provides a basis for estimating the expected time
to gather the input data and what to expect in the form of
outputs. Physical limitations, such as computers for which
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usable versions of the model are available, the programming
language used, and typical running times for the model, are
necessary contents of the non-technical manual. The time of
such senior managers is limited and valuable. Only that
information necessary to provide a general description and
basis for meaningful discussions between the decision maker
and the analyst should be included. Any details required
will be provided by the analyst, who will conduct the study,
during planning, progress, and review sessions. Yet the
documentation must make the model sufficiently transparent
so that the decision maker: understands what is happening and
finds the model credible for the problem at hand.
G. ANALYST'S CONCEPTUAL-TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
The analyst's conceptual-technical reference manual must
necessarily contain detailed information on all aspects of
the model. This is the document that determines the
overall worth of the model as an analytical tool. If
sufficient detail is contained then the analyst can become
intimately familiar with the model, so that any aberation
encountered during operation of the model can be understood
by him and explained to the decision maker. To maximize its
value to an analyst, it should be written by the analyst or
analysts that design the model. Their professional
experience will guide them in providing the kind of
information about the model that they would want if they
were using a model designed by someone else.
The size of the analyst's reference manual will be a
function of the complexity of the model. To be useful and
credible a model must be transparent and transferable. To
be transparent and transferable all necessary details of the
model must be provided. Information on the data base used
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in the model, input requirements and format as well as
output format and options must be detailed. All that can be
assumed is that the analyst is knowledgeable in the use of
the tools of his profession. In preparing tha analyst's
manual no prior knowlelga of the model can be assumed. As
Morris [2] recommended, the obvious should be written down.
All constraints and limitations must be described in detail
as well as assumptions used, logic flow and
interactions. Sufficient technical detail to allow the
analyst to manually trace inputs through the algorithms is
necessary. Mathematical, statistical, an! numerical
methods incorporated in the model should be described
including any new or unique applications. Any constraints
which will affect the accuracy of the modeL must be
identified. Obvious pitfalls must be stated; thay are only
obvious to the developer and in complex models without
documentation they can even be forgotten by the
developer. The physical processes simulated must be
described including an explanation and rationalization of
the techniques used. Eaoh variable and the entity it
represents must be clearly stated. Lastly, sufficient
instructions describing how to set up and use the model and
flow charts keyed to the program instructions should be
provided. Squally important is a system that keys the
description of each mathematical formulation in the manual
to the appropriate section and lines of the program
code. This will facilitate the location of tha code, when
the analyst wants to modify the model.
These are the basic requirements for the contents of
documents to be prepared by the designer of a model. Each
time a modification to the model is made, the changed
program instruction, reasons why the change was necessary,
how and what is affected in the model, and the
rationalization for the particular modification should be
documented and incorporated into the original
60

documentation. This aspsct of documentation is critical
because analyst and programmers have been known to make
small insignificant changes to programs without documenting
them. Two results can come about because of this. Over
time these minor undocumented changes accumulate, then one
day those who implemented the changes transfer or depart.
The newly arrived analyst now has a model which does not
quite fit his documentation. If enough time has passed
even those who made the change will not completely remember
it when they are questioned or they are no longer
available. Even more disheartening is that in failing to
document, a critical inspection of the effect of the change
on other parts of the model is not made. Unbeknownst to the
individual the modification causes an effect elsewhere in
the model that is not readily . discernable at the
time. Utimately, another modification is made and the model
malfunctions or an anomalous output occurs. If undocumented
modifications have been made and forgotten it may be
impossible to trace the cause of the anomaly. If it can be
traced, the cost of trouble shooting and correcting the
model will be greater than the cost of documenting the
modifications at the time of their addition. Current
studies will be delayed with their attendant costs and the
credibility of the modeling community will suffer. The
decision maker justifiably becomes skeptical when the
analyst cannot explain why the results of a model are not
compatible with the decision maker's intuitive
expectations. If a model is to aid in the decision making
process its outputs must be explainable and understandable
to the decision maker. If the analyst has not designed the
model then his only source of the necessary information is
the documentation supplied with the model.
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H. PROGRAMMER'S TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
The final level of required documentation is the
detailed information reguired by the programmer for the
operation and maintenance of the model. This is the
documentation that is discussed in great detail in all
standard texts, while methods of documenting the conceptual
basis of models is almost entirely foregone. The manual is
necessarily prepared by the model programmer in conjunction
with the analyst who has designed the model. It must
contain descriptions of each global variable and in which
subprograms the variable is found. Descriptions of the
functions performed by the program, data flow charts,
function flow charts, approximations and numerical
procedures used are also contained in this
documentation. Likewise, any implicit assumptions made by
the programmer during the coding process to facilitate
computation must be documented.
Often, though the analyst designer has structured the
model to handle the general case, during implementation of
the model on tha computer some loss of generalization
occurs. In the search for programming efficiency the
computer programmer may oode a combat process so that the
model works for only those circumstance explicitly stated by
the designer. Whereas the designer believes he has a
general model the programmer has reduced the generality of
the model. Unless this is documented by the programmer, in
subsequent use of the model the fact that the model was
programmed in such a manner may be forgotten. In this case
the computer routines embody more assumptions than exist in
the formal model designed by the analyst. It is incumbent
upon the programmer to bring this fact to the attention of
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the analyst. He inturn Bust include this information in his
documentation. Dnly he can conceptualize in terms of real
world factors the impact of the programmer's assumptions on
the inputs and outputs.
Further contents of the detailed programming na,nual must
indicate primary and secondary storage requirements, error
detection and recovery procedures, and instructions for
initiation and termination of program operation. These
pieces of information are required if other programmers are
to be able to understand and operate the model. If a model
is transferred this information is necessary to implement
the model on a computer of different design. It provides
the receiving programmer the necessary information to
prepare system operating programs and procedures so that the
model can be exercised by the receiving agency without
inadvertent ly making changes to the logic of the
model. This is especially critical for complex
models. With such models attempts to restructure programs
to overcome incompatibilities in storage or other machine
requirements may introduce changes to the fundamental logic
of the model unbeknownst to either the programmer or the
analyst. Without adequate documentation such restructuring
must be accomplished with only luck to guide the way and as
complexity of the model increases luck is quickly
depleted
.
When the original programmer completes the programming
(coding) of the model the model must be verified and
validated in conjuntion with the analyst designer. When
both are satisfied that the model is operating as designed a
listing of the compiled assembled program should be
made. This is then supplemented by a set of working notes
on program operations, set up of the deck to exercise the
model, special programming features and identification of
potential problem areas and suggested solutions.
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The compilation of the above documentation into a
detailed programmer's manual will provide a sound basis for
review and analysis of the model's capabilities and for
maintenance of the model's logic; it will facilitate
transfer and insure transparency. Furthermore, each time
the programmer makes a modification to the program it must
be documented and incorporated into the programmer's
manual. Concurrently, it must be brought to the attention
of the analyst to relate the programming change to the
combat process modeled and update the analyst's and decision
maker's manual. This coordination between the programmer
and the analyst must always occur if both are to remain
fully cognizant of what as well as how the model simulates
the real world. Only through such documentation can a model
be transferred to a new programmer and analyst team and be
knowledgeably used.
I. INLINE DOCUMENTATION, A MAP THRU THE MAZE
A necessary adjunct to this proposed documentation
package is documentation within the program. Such
documentation should be in the form of comment oards that
briefly describe the main program, the major sub-models,
suoroutine and each function subprogram. They should be
inserted at appropriate locations so that logic of the
program is readily apparent. Nothing is more frustrating
to an analyst that is attempting to gain a quick basic
understanding of a model than a series of calls to
subroutines which inturn call other subroutines and or
function subprograms. In a complex model this quickly hides
the logic of the model from the analyst. To pierce this
shroud the analyst must devote time that could better be
used elsewhere. If the exigencies of the situation demand a
rapid response and no other model is readily available this
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encourages the analyst to use the model as the proverbial
"black box". This neither adds to transparency nor does it
enhance the reputation of the analyst or operations
research
.
Most current programming texts recommend using comment
cards to enhance understanding of programs. In complex
models this is not a nicety but a necessity. Time devoted
to this effort initially not only enhances the use of a
complex model but reduces recurring costs. Professionalism
demands that a model should not be used without
understanding how it functions or at least believing one
understands how it functions. The realities of military
personnel policies dictate that military analysts will
rotate rapidly through assignments. If a program is not
documented internally this self-educating step occurs each
time a new analyst uses a particular model. Given a complex
model and normal personnel turnover a sizeable cost is
incurred. With adequate internal documentation this cost
will occur only once. Because of personnel rotation models
not currently having such internal documentation should have
it added. Though it will detract an analyst for an
additional amount of time initially, over the longer term a
savings will be realized. Each subsequent analyst will not
have to start from scratch when trying to gain an
understanding of how the model functions; understanding will
be facilitated by internal documentation via comment cards.
J. UPDATING A MODEL'S DDCO MENTATION
Changes to models occur over extended periods of time.
Obviously, at the time changes are instituted the process
through which they were developed, why and how they were
entered into the model ani all assumptions used must be
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annotated in all appropriate documentation at the agency
instituting the change. Some of these changes will be
extremely large and will justify formal changes being
printed and distributed for all affected
documentation. Some changes will be small; formal printing
of individual changes would not be justified. These would
have to be accumulated and changes printed, when
economically practical. The management of the process and
the determination of whan printing and distribution of
changes is economically practical are beyond the scope of
the thesis. rhey are important subjects and should be
examined in some future thesis.
K. SUMMARY
Since the analysts and programmers that develop a
particular model are not always present or available when
the model is exercised, especially if it is transferred to
another agency, it is their responsibility to detail their
assumptions, simplifications and methodologies and provide
evidence that the rationale behind their approach will
produce results usable in the real-world environment as
viewed by the ultimate decision maker. Analysts and
programmers that create a model must provide documentation
that establishes the issues examined by the model,
underlying the objectives and assumptions, the usability and
usefulness of the model. Only with such documentation can
the analyst or analysts assisting a decision maker in the
resolution of a particular problem conclude that the use of
a specific model is appropriate. The real "user" of a
model is the decision maker. The analyst must recognize
in assisting the decision maker he is a model designer and
model manipulator. The officer analyst must gain detailed
knowledge of any model he uses in support of an analysis.
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To acquire such knowledge a model must be adequately
documented. In combat modeling there are three levels of





To enhance the ability of the analyst to fully
understand the model his documentation should be presented
from the context of discovery rather than the traditional
context of justification. This will allow the analyst to
know the alternatives considered and rejected in structuring
a model as well as giving him greater insights into the
underlying hypothesis of a model.
The types of documentation required are:
Decision Maker's Non-technical Documentation;
Analyst 1 s Conceptual-technical Documentation;
Programmer's Technical Documentation;
Inline Documentation.
Since model modification and improvement is a continuing
process the preparation of formal changes must be
economically practical and carefully managed. This area of
model documentation is suitable for a subsequent thesis.
67

VII. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FINAL REMARKS
A. SUMMAHY. OF PROBLEMS DISCUSSED
Since 1973 the impetus in the Army modeling community
has been to develop scenarios and models that can be used
throughout the Army community for decisions on material
reguirements and force development. The ultimata purpose is
to bring consistancy into the decision making
process. Inherent in this goal is not only the need for
standard agreed upon scenarios but foe a repertory of models
to be used by all interested agencies examining a particular
facet of the Army. This ioes not necessarily mean that only
one model should be used for a particular
investigation. Because of the assumptions necessary to
develop any model, given the necessary time and money it is
best to exercise more than one model in order to get an
indication of how the assumptions affect the outputs of each
of the models. What is fundamental is the need for all
agencies examining a given situation to be able to
understand each other's models; this will provide the basis
for intelligent discussion of the pros and cons of equipment
and force requirements.
As operations research and system analysis have gained
acceptance by DOD and Department of the Army, more combat
models of various levels of military operations have been
created and used. Increased use of models resulted in
increased levels of complexity. Complexity in turn caused
new models to be created when potential users could not
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sufficiently understand and use existing models given
available documentation. This unnecessary proliferation
resulted in unexplainable conflicting results which caused
the credibility of combat modeling to be questioned. If
this situation is to be resolved unnecessary proliferation
must be checked and mutual understanding enhanced. To
achieve this goal models must be easily transferable between
investigating agencies. Fundamental to this ability is
complete and up to date documentation of the model to be
reviewed or exercised. This documentation will allow the
potential user to analyze the model and determine its
suitability for a given project.
Concomitant with the need to easily transfer models is
the need to fully understand the machination by which a
given set of input data is acted upon to produce
outputs. If outputs of a computer model are to be useful
they must be credible. Conflicting outputs of military
models are consistently challenged by some government agency
of the DOD, the Congress, the Executive Office or some other
branch of the government. Unless these challenges are
answered and conflicts explained, the credibility of combat
modeling will continue to suffer. Some criticism is needed
to purify combat modeling and identify errors that
inevitably will appear, some eminates from those advocating
a competitive model or concept and some of it is from those
that criticize the validity and usefulness of combat
modeling itself. At times inadequate documentation has
precluded the explanation of conflicting results by the
analyst and added to the criticism.
The Comptroller General [15] found that existing models
have been used by other than the designer without thoroughly
understanding their implications and limitations. At times
this has resulted in erroneous conclusions being drawn and
decisions made based on these conclusions. Subsequently,
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the errors are surfaced with a loss not only in dollars
expended in pursuit of undesirable projects but in further
loss of credibility for theatre-level combat modeling.
Adequate documentation will help alleviate some of the
adverse publicity and loss of credibility that theatre-level
combat modeling has experienced in the past. To a great
extent this has stemmed from unexplainable contradictory
results using models purporting to represent the same
process. To allay the criticism of models and their
outputs and to enable both the analyst that exercises the
model and the decision mater that uses the outputs to aid in
the decision making process the model must be
understood. Understanding can be enhanced through proper
documentation. Adequate documentation of the form proposed
will facilitate communication between the decision maker and
analyst as well as between the analyst and the
programmer. Unless these communication links are
established misunderstanding of combat models will persist
and the credibility of combat models and modeling will
suffer accordingly.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions drawn from this research are:
The decision maker is the "user" of a model.
To be of value a model must be accepted by the
decision maker.
The analyst must relate the abstractions of the
model to the actual combat process.
The analyst is a model manipulator.
The analyst must understand and explain the
methodology and structure of a model.
Understanding is deterred by complexity.
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Models are becoming more complex.
Increased levels of complexity result in
diminished transparency.
Inability to understand and use existing model
causes development of redundant models.
Unnecessary proliferation causes conflicting
results to be produced by similar models.
Inability to explain conflicting results is the
basic cause of a lack of credibility.
Proliferation can be reduced through model
sharing. Sharing a model requires:
ability to use it with minimal conversion;
adequate facilities to run the model;
sufficient competent analysts and programmers;
adequate documentaton;
formalized irrangements for cost sharing and
coordination.
Prior to transferring a model it must be analyzed for





• model logic and structure;
available data and required data;
time and resources required.










The degree to which meaningful model evaluation can be
accomplished is significantly influenced by available
documentation. Documentation is key to the understanding
of complex models. The research conducted indicated:
Adequate documentation is a necessary if a
model is to be used by other than the
originator
.
Organization exigencies deter adequate
documentation.
Documentation of combat models is generally
inadequate.
If a model is poorly documented it may be more
economical to build a new one than share an
existing modal.
Efforts are being made to improve documentation.
The author's experience with and research of combat
model documentation indicates that there are three levels of
interaction with combat models. These levels have unique
and common requirements for documentation. To satisfy these





The decision maker's and the programmer's documentation
must provide the information listed in chapter six. It can
be presented in the traditional manner using techniques
contained in most computer system management texts.
However, to function as the link between the decision maker
and the programmer and to understand the nuances of the
model, the analyst needs documentation that provides greater
insights than possible with the current available
documentation. These insights will be provided if the
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analyses document at ion is presented from the context of
discovery rather than the traditional context of
justification.
Many changes to a model occur over extended periods of
time. The method of determining whan it is economically
practical to print formal changes, their disribution,
control, and management is critical to the proposed
hierarchy of documentation. These topics are appropriate
for future research.
C. FINAL HEriARKS
Acceptance or rejection of an expository thesis in
matters such as documentation often depends on the skill of
the pleader and the mood of the audience. Staring at the
same set of evidence the parties to the debate can come to
sharply different conclusions, since their preconceived
notions may lead them to select and interpret the evidence
in different ways. Even though one may initially find it
difficult to believe that there are ways to acquire adequate
documentation not yet tried by analysts or advocated by
agencies researching the problem, the very complexity and
pervasiveness of the problem suggests the possibility of
combining the various proposals in different ways so that
some combination will produce the desired goal. The
proposal presented is but one possible means to achieve the
desired end. Of even more importance is the fact that some
methodology must be adopted to correct this lack of adequate
documentation. With regard to theatre-level combat models,
the problem has persistel for almost twenty years. Not only
has it made it near impossible to easily transfer models
between interested agencies but it has preventai military




The conflicting opinisns and evaluations unmasked during
this research confirm what is intuitively obvious: many of
the historical judgements and decisions concerning
operations research in general and theatre- level combat
modeling in particular are based on subjective values as
well as objective facts. Unlike the natural scientist or
the analyst using a simulation, the researcher examining the
process through which combat modeling has evolved, cannot
reproduce the events and by experimentally altering the
ingredients, change the result. The development of combat
modeling is well documented; yet controversies have
developed despite the voluminous sources. Analysts disagree
not because one may be more knowledgeable about the subject
than another, but because each weighs and evaluates
differently those facts of which both have knowledge. There
is little dispute about the details of what has happened in
the development of theatre-level combat models but there is
intense disagreement on the significance of past events and
how to proceed in the future. The analyst has no fixed
point from which to observe the stream of events concerning
the development of theatre-level combat models. Analysts
are borne along by the current and their interpretation of
what has occurred is influenced by their view of where the
stream seems to be headed and whether the apparent
destination appears to be good or bad for the enhancement
and development of the OR profession.
Although theatre-level combat modeling attempts to be
scientific in its methods, it is rarely so in its
outputs. Outputs are interwoven with subjective judgements,
either through their interpretation or by way of the inputs
that were instrumental to producing the outputs or in the
very construction of the model itself. The relativity of
subjective judgement, while discouraging, need not be
74

debilitating to theatre-level combat modeling. Because
these models are the only means of examining force structure
questions vital to national security, analysts are
confronted with the continuing task of rethinking the basic
structures of these models. Past models can furnish us a
vast reservoir of experience in theatre- level combat
modeling which can be exploited to further this aspect of
operations research. However, this reservoir can be
effectively used for the enhancement of the profession only
if what has been accomplished is adequately documented so
that others may correctly use models previously
developed. In this manner, even though no model can fully
treat all the intricacies of the combat process, the analyst
can enrich the profession through the continuing effort to
better model the process fully using all the knowledge that
has come before.
The concept of documentation that this paper proposes
will not cure all the ills. It is but a proposal to correct
a defect, inadequate documentation, that has long plaqued
theatre- level combat modeling. But if it is faithfully
executed with the same energy and level of effort that has
been expended in decrying the problem of inadequate
documentation, then there is hope that the omission can be
corrected. It is imperative that analysts adequately
document newly designed models or modifications to existing
models so that other analysts may use them properly. Before
a project is considered complete it is the analyst's
responsibility to insure that the vital step of
documentation is accomplished. Only in this manner can
there be assurance that the model designed or modified can
be fully understood by those who subsequently want to use
the model. Analysts using existing models must expand and
supplement the current available documentation of existing
models in the active inventory. The next time an existing
model is used professionalism demands it be fully
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understood; any new undocumented factors uncovared in its
examination should be formally noted and made a permanent
part of the official documentation. In this manner past
omissions will be corrected, the scientific method will be
invigorated and the standing of the Operations Research
profession enhanced. Subsequent results will then be more
fully explainable and posses greater credibility and even if
the conclusions cannot be final, because of the impalpable
nature of the subject, the techniques of theatre-level
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